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The Criminal Time Bomb:
An Examination of the Effect of the Russian Mafiya




In 1989, the Western world celebrated the apparent triumph of democracy
and capitalism over communism. Overnight, the "evil empire"' became a
potential partner. In fact, some Western thinkers were so overcome that
Francis Fukuyama maintained the fall of communism signaled "the end of
history."2 Unfortunately, the optimistic predictions of 1989 have not come to
pass. The Russian economy has responded slowly to reform.3 Communists
and ultranationalists are regaining strength in the Russian government." More
ominously, organized crime is threatening to overwhelm Russian politics,
economics, and society.
On February 12, 1993, President Boris Yeltsin stated that "organized crime
has become a direct threat to Russia's strategic interests and national
security."5  One year later, Yeltsin again recognized the threat when he
declared that "organised crime is trying to take [Russia] by the throat and has
become the number one problem for Russia today." Despite Yeltsin's
recognition of the problem, organized crime in Russia and the other Newly
Independent States of the former Soviet Union is gaining strength. 7
* J.D. Candidate, 1997, Indiana University School of Law (Bloomington); B.A., summa cum laude,
1994, University of Notre Dame. I would like to thank Professor David Fidler for his invaluable assistance
and Professor Michael Alexeev for his helpful comments. This Note covers events in the former Soviet
Union up to October 31, 1996.
1. Former President Ronald Reagan referred to the Soviet Union as the "evil empire" in a speech
in Orlando, Florida. Ronald Reagan, President's Message to the National Association of Evangelicals
(March 8, 1983), in 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc., Jan.-Mar. 1983, at 364, 369.
2. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History?, NATIONAL INTEREST, Summer 1989, at 3, 18.
3. See MAURICE ERNST ET AL., TRANSFORMING THE CORE; RESTRUCTURING INDUSTRIAL
ENTERPRISES IN RUSSIA AND CENTRAL EUROPE 221-71 (1996).
4. See infra notes 175-181 and accompanying text.
5. Russia: Conference on Combating Crime: Yeltsin Outlines Ways of Combating Crime, BBC
SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Feb. 15, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, BBCSWB File.
6. CHRISTOPHER J. ULRICH, CONFLICT STUD. No. 275, THE PRICE OF FREEDOM: THE CRIMINAL
THREAT IN RUSSIA, EASTERN EUROPE AND THE BALTIC REGION 3 (1994).
7. Although this note focuses primarily on Russia, my arguments apply to the other Newly
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Evidencing the power of organized crime, Dr. Ariel Cohen of the Heritage
Foundation submitted the following testimony to the House International
Affairs Committee:
In Russia today, there are over 5,000 gangs, 3,000 hardened criminals,
300 mob bosses, and 150 illegal organizations with international
connections. Approximately 40,000 Russian business and industrial
enterprises are controlled by organized crime. Their combined output
is higher than the gross national product of many members of the
United Nations. The Russian mafiya... is estimated to turn over in
excess of $10 billion a year. More Russians died of criminal violence
in 1993 than were killed during nine years of war in Afghanistan. In
1994, criminals took 118 people hostage in Moscow alone. Ten
Western businessmen were kidnapped for ransom in 1995, and one of
them murdered. The situation in the other Newly Independent States
of the former Soviet Union is worse, with criminal gangs even
controlling the value of some national currencies!
As Senator Sam Nunn has argued, "crime, and particularly organized
crime, has become one of the most dangerous forces to arise from the collapse
of the Soviet system."9 In the Newly Independent States of the former Soviet
Union, the mafiya has undermined economic reform, aggravated the public's
dissatisfaction with their current regimes, and subverted government decisions.
Nevertheless, in spite of all the negative effects associated with the presence
of the mafiya in these transitional states, several academics and economists,
like Yegor Gaidar, Yeltsin's first deputy prime minister, maintain that
corruption in a market economy is not unprecedented. Gaidar and like-minded
thinkers contend that "corruption does not halt economic growth," nor is it a
permanent fixture of the society because, as reform continues, "the soil in
which corruption grows will shrink."'10 Others from the same school of thought
Independent States of the former Soviet Union, as their economic and political conditions are generally
analogous to those in Russia. Global Organized Crime: Hearing Before the House Comm. on International
Relations, 104th Cong. 68 (1996) (testimony of Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., Senior Analyst, Heritage Foundation)
[hereinafter Global Organized Crime Hearing].
8. Id.
9. International Organized Crime and Its Impact on the United States: Hearing Before the
Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 103d Cong. 1 (1994)
(statement of Senator Sam Nunn).
10. Mikhail Leontyev, Reformers: "Permanent Bandit" on the Road to Stabilization; Comments
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assert the mafiya acts as a surrogate for the developing capitalist government
by enforcing contracts and protecting consumers. They argue that in the case
of Russia, the government should not unleash the police against the mafiya
until the transitional government has "acquire[d] a functioning system of
commercial-law, administrative, and fiscal courts.""
Despite the fact that the presence of the mafiya in a transitional economy
may have certain benefits, the reform that would render the mafiya obsolete
might never occur, if a transitional government does not take immediate action
against the mafiya. This conclusion is the primary thesis of this Note. I argue
that time and the ability of a transitional government to overcome the mafiya
are inversely related. In other words, as time passes, the Newly Independent
States of the former Soviet Union will lose the ability to combat organized
crime effectively. My argument proceeds as follows. In Section I, I define
what is meant by the word mafiya. Then in Sections II and III, I examine the
conditions that allowed organized crime to flourish after the collapse of the
Soviet Union. In Sections IV and V, I demonstrate how the mafiya affects
economic reform, public attitudes, and political development. In Section VI,
I discuss how, over time, criminal gangs become impervious to government
regulation because they perpetuate and enhance the very conditions that
initially allowed them to flourish. Finally in Section VII, I briefly address the
international implications of the mafiya.
I. THE MAFIYA: WHAT IS IT? 12
For many years, Communist propaganda attempted to portray life in the
Soviet Union as virtually crime-free. 3 This depiction of Soviet life, however,
was a contrived fiction. Vadim Bakatin, the Soviet Union's last chairman of
the KGB, admitted that "[a]fter 1917, [the Soviet] crime rate grew just like
Made During an Economic Conference, SEVODNYA, Apr. 22, 1995, at 3 (excerpts), reprinted in CURRENT
DIG. OF THE POST-SOVIET PRESS, May 17, 1995, vol. XLVII, no. 16, at 9, available in LEXIS, News Library,
CDSP File.
11. Edward Luttwak, Has the Mafia Saved Russia?, WORLD PRESS REV., Oct. 1995, at 48.
12. Stephen Handelman uses the word mafiya (instead of "mafia") in order to accent the differences
between Russian and foreign organized crime. STEVEN HANDELMAN, COMRADE CRIMINAL: RUSSIA'S NEW
MAFIYA 350 n.5 (1995). In light of Handelman's convincing arguments (upon which I rely heavily in this
section), I have chosen to use the same spelling in this Note.
13. Izvestia's Analytic Center, Criminal Russia: Excesses in the Time of Redistribution of Property,
IZVESTIA, Oct. 18, 1994, at 5 (condensed text), reprinted in CURRENT DIG. OF THE POST-SOVIET PRESS, Nov.
23, 1994, vol. XLVI, no. 43, at 13, available in LEXIS, News Library, CDSP File.
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everywhere else in the world.""' Indeed, crime, particularly organized crime,
had been active in Russia since the time of the czars. In the seventeenth
century, groups of highwaymen, thieves, and smugglers thrived in Russia. As
the years passed, these groups developed strict rules and codes of honor. 5 As
the structure of these groups became more rigid, outsiders were strictly
forbidden and the vorovskoi mir, Thieves World or Thieves Society, came into
existence.'
In the 1960s, a vibrant black market was operating in the Soviet Union,
and "gangsters acted as unofficial middlemen in the 'gray' and 'black'
economies, circulating privately produced goods or state materials with the
tacit cooperation of the factory managers and apparatchiks [civil servants]."' 7
As profits grew, elements within the vorovskoi mir began to work more closely
with the government officials in their regions. Over time, spheres of influence
developed and the gangsters within a particular area banded together to form
large criminal organizations. 8 Claire Sterling describes the structure of these
organizations as resembling a classic criminal pyramid: "at the base, are
common street hoods, under gang leaders who run their territory like military
boot camps .... On top of the pyramid are the godfathers, the indomitable
vory v zakone,"'9 which literally means Thieves-in-Law or Thieves-within-the-
Code, and is usually shortened to the word vory. Currently, in the post-Soviet
criminal world, the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs estimates there are
approximately 740 active vory of which 100 are operating from within
prison.20 These vory are not constantly at war; rather, they stress order.
According to Deputy Chief Pavlovich of the Russian Interior Ministry's Sixth
Department to Combat Organized Crime, the vory have specific spheres of
influence and meet periodically to settle territorial disputes, decide on
operations, and make policy.
2
'
By the time perestroika began, the line between the vorovskoi mir and the
Soviet government was difficult to distinguish. Both groups had amassed
fortunes through the black market and corruption. In fact, Soviet prosecutors
14. HANDELMAN, supra note 12, at 276.
15. Steven Handelman, The Russian Mafrya, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-Apr. 1994, at 83, 86.
16. HANDELMAN, supra note 12, at 28.
17. Handelman, supra note 15, at 86.
18. Id.
19. Claire Sterling, Redfellas, NEw REPUBLIC, Apr. 11, 1994, at 19-20.
20. HANDELMAN, supra note 12, at 40.
21. Sterling, supra note 19, at 20.
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first used the word mafiya to describe corrupt Soviet bureaucrats.2 As
privatization approached, both the vory and the nomenklatura, the elite
membership of the Soviet system, prepared for the future. The vory met in
secret at a dacha near Moscow and planned their strategy,' while "[the] party
bodies (and the KGB) quietly siphoned funds to trading companies and export-
import firms that were being positioned to take advantage of [the new
opportunities].'
By 1992, it was clear that both the vory and the former nomenklatura had
survived the fall of communism, and in June of 1992, the word mafiya
resurfaced with an ominous new meaning. In a public statement, Deputy
Russian Internal Affairs Minister Andrei Dunayev "blamed the explosion of
criminal violence on the mafiya."'25 However, unlike before, the term mafiya
encompassed both the individuals from outside the power structure and the
individuals representing continuity from the old Communist bureaucracy to the
new post-Soviet political arrangement.' According to Professor Louise
Shelley, "[This] unusual coalition of professional criminals, former members
of the underground economy, members of the former Party elite, and the
security apparatus defies traditional conceptions of organized crime groups.
..,27 It embodies "the political and economic power of a criminal class more
sophisticated than anything Russia has ever experienced before. 23
Consequently, this coalition represents a great threat to the economic and
political viability of Russia and the Newly Independent States of the former
Soviet Union, and one can neither conceptualize nor combat this structure like
a traditional mafia organization.
II. THE FERTILE GARDEN
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the mafiya's economic and political
power has grown astronomically. On the economic front between 1989 and
1991, the mafiya's earnings increased from less than one billion rubles to 130
22. HANDELMAN, supra note 12, at 21.
23. Id. at 28.
24. Handelman, supra note 15, at 87.
25. HANDELMAN, supra note 12, at 21.
26. Louise Shelley, Post-Soviet Organized Crime and the Rule of Law, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
827,829 (1995).
27. Id.
28. HANDELMAN, supra note 12, at 21.
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billion, "the size of the Soviet national deficit."' 9 Alexander Gurov, head of
the Soviet Interior Ministry's Sixth Department, reported in 1991 that "[i]n the
next few years, its [gross] will reach 200 billion rubles. Organized crime then
will control thirty to forty percent of the country's GNP.""0 On the political
front, public opinion tells the story.
A poll in the summer of 1992 indicated that one-third of the residents
in the Russian Far East believed that criminal structures "determined
the course of events in the region." . . . A year after the Far East
survey, another poll taken in the city of Yekaterinburg, in the Ural
Mountains, suggested that three-quarters of the residents believed their
city was ruled by the mafiya. Interestingly, so did fourteen percent of
the city's police."
Based on these facts, it is not difficult to assert that organized crime is one of
the most powerful forces in the former Soviet Union. However, in spite of the
careful planning of the vory and nomenklatura, the mafiya's rise to power was
primarily due to several specific factors that created a situation in which the
mafiya could thrive.
A. Privatization
One of the factors which allowed the mafiya to flourish was inefficient,
unregulated, and non-egalitarian privatization. In order to transfer the
Communist State's holdings to the people, both the Soviet government and its
successors embarked upon a policy of massive privatization. Unfortunately,
rather than transfer property to the people, Russian privatization policies
resulted in the transfer of the property directly into the mafiya's coffers. Three
factors contributed to this misplaced transfer of holdings. First, in order to
take advantage of privatization, an individual had to possess a large amount of
capital. At the time of privatization, only organized crime had sufficient
capital to benefit from the government's policies. 2 As a result, shortly after
the government began to privatize State property, the Russian Tass-Krim Press
29. Sterling, supra note 19, at 19.
30. Id.
31. HANDELMAN, supra note 12, at 21-22.
32. Shelley, supra note 26, at 829.
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reported that the mafiya had gained control of "between fifty percent and
eighty percent of all shops, storehouses, depots, hotels, and services in
Moscow."33
Second, because the democratically elected government left privatization
in the hands of the bureaucracy, former Communist Party members were
provided with the opportunity to grab many desirable State-owned properties,
while black-market operators and criminals got the rest.34 Take, for example,
the experience of Kazakhstan:
[In this country], civil servants quietly transferred dozens of state-
owned properties into their own names. "All the lucrative state
properties have already been seized," charged Serik Abdrakhmanov,
a deputy of the Kazakh parliament, at the end of 1992. He added that
bureaucrats compounded the plunder of national resources by
financing their clandestine acquisitions on cheap credit. "These
officials have no trouble [getting money], but an ordinary person
cannot receive a loan from the National State Bank," he complained."
Moreover, if the corrupt bureaucrats did not take the properties for themselves,
they accepted bribes and arranged for the properties to be delivered to specific
parties. In fact, "according to calculations by experts, seventy percent of the
real estate put up for sale at auctions ends up in the hands of predetermined
individuals."36 These people then sell the properties for outrageous profits.
Commodities expert Borovoi cites the case of one particular building
to illustrate the point. The first stage of the privatization was closed
to outsiders; the city sold the rights to auction off the building to five
well-connected (Borovoi says "criminal") organizations for 1.5
million rubles. At the secondary auction, accessible to well-connected
outsiders who paid bribes, the property is sold for 250 million rubles.
Finally, the building went on the open market, selling for 1.5 billion
rubles (about $1.5 million). The thousandfold appreciation in value
33. Sterling, supra note 19, at 20-22.
34. Vladimir Bukovsky, Boris Yeltsin's Hollow Victory, COMMENTARY, June 1993, at 31, 34.
35. HANDELMAN, supra note 12, at 125.
36. Izvestia's Analytic Center, Criminal Russia: The Unknown War Against Corruption, IZVESTIA,
Oct. 22, 1994, at 5 (condensed text), reprinted in CURRENT DIG. OF THE POST-SOVIET PRESS, Dec. 14, 1994,
vol. XLVI, no. 46, at 15, available in LEXIS, News Library, CDSP File.
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took all of two months.37
The third reason privatization has failed to escape the grasp of the mafiya
is because political reform has not accompanied economic reform.
Consequently, even when the government tries to implement a well-
intentioned privatization plan, corrupt bureaucrats subvert it. For example,
Yegor Gaidar, Yeltsin's first deputy minister in charge of the economy,
attempted to execute a privatization plan that excluded insiders and gave a
majority of the shares to outsiders. The goal of this plan was to increase
efficiency in the factories. However, when Gaidar submitted his proposal for
parliamentary approval, opposition forces altered it to allow the insiders a
means of retaining control.38 Further, even when the government is successful
and the property ends up in the public's hands, organized crime often uses
intimidation to gain control of the stock. According to the Russian Academy
of Sciences' Analytic Center, "thirty-five percent of all capital and eighty
percent of all 'voting' shares have now moved into the hands of criminal
capital. . . ."" With control of these shares, the mafiya can delegate a
representative to a company's board or council of directors.'
Under communism, the State controlled all of the property in the Soviet
Union. Based on this fact, Tatjana Kurjaghina, a top social economist for the
Interior Ministry, predicted in 1991 that once privatization began to replace
communism, the entire country would be up for sale.4 By 1992, it became
apparent that her prediction was correct. Regrettably, however, the mafiya was
one of the few groups to take advantage of the bargains. As a result, the mafiya
is now a formidable economic and political actor in the former Soviet Union.
B. The Legal System
In addition to the errant privatization efforts, the condition of the legal
system in the former Soviet Union fostered the rapid growth of organized
crime. Under the Soviet regime, dealing with crime was not one of the
37. Paul Klebnikov, Joe Stalin's Heirs, FORBES, Sept. 27, 1993, at 124, 133-134.
38. Michael McFaul, Why Russia's Politics Matter, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb. 1995, at 87, 91-92.
39. Olga Kryshtanovskaya, Russia's Mafia Landscape: A Sociologist's View, IZVESTA, Sept. 21,
1995, at 5 (condensed text), reprinted in CURRENT DIG. OF THE POST-SOVIET PRESS, Oct. 18, 1995, vol.
XLVII, no. 38, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, CDSP File.
40. Id.
41. Sterling, supra note 19, at 20.
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Communist government's primary concerns. According to Vadim Bakatin, the
Soviet Union's last chairman of the KGB:
We thought that as socialism was perfected, the social base for crime
would gradually disappear, and crime would disappear as well.... So
there was no point in spending money on criminal justice, on
modernizing the police, on training prosecutors, or even on improving
our courts. That attitude left us vulnerable to everything that has
happened since.4
Indeed, in Russia, police enforcement is in dire straits. To begin with, the
mafiya is far better equipped in "weapons, communications systems, and
transport" than Russian law enforcement. " The situation is so bad that in
some cases the police officers have been forced "to pursue criminals by taxi
or bus."" In fact, the police are trailing so far behind organized crime in
logistics that Internal Ministry officials believe "it would take twenty-five
years for the police to match the arsenals of the mafiya under their current
reequipment schedules. '
An additional problem is police corruption. According to Claire Sterling,
"[b]y 1991, 20,000 police officers were being fired yearly for collusion with
the mafiya--double the rate under Brezhnev." Younger police officers are
most at risk because many "see the chance to take bribes as the main reason for
joining the police."'47 However, a major part of the corruption problem results
from the conditions under which the police must work. For example, "a
Russian militiaman in May, 1993, put his life on the line every day for thirty
thousand rubles--about thirty dollars--a month, a lower wage than many
factory workers received." '48 In the face of such formidable adversity, it is
hardly surprising that ninety-five percent of the Moscow police force is
suspected of being under mafiya control.49
Compounding the problems of the beleaguered Russian police force is the
42. HANDELMAN, supra note 12, at 276.
43. Sterling, supra note 19, at 20.
44. Handelman, supra note 15, at 89.
45. HANDELMAN, supra note 12, at 282.
46. Sterling, supra note 19, at 19.
47. Russia's Mafia: More Crime than Punishment, ECONOMIST, July 9, 1994, at 22 [hereinafter
Russia's Mafia].
48. HANDELMAN, supra note 12, at 282.
49. Russia's Mafia, supra 47, at 22.
1996]
GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES JOURNAL
antiquated state of Russian law. In 1994, Victor Ageyev, an official from the
Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, made the following observation:
The current state of crime is ... characterized by the fact that [its]
quality has changed--it has become more intellectual, more
professional, more organized and refined. New forms of economic
crime have appeared. The legislation currently in effect is so outdated
that [it] does not take those forms of crime into account. That is,
according to [the] legislation, the most widespread and serious
economic transgressions cannot be classified as crimes. Moreover,
most of the normative acts regulating economic relations do not
provide for any sanctions if they are violated. None!5"
In the initial years following the fall of communism, Russia had: "no
mechanism for controlling private banks, no sanctions for money laundering,
no screening for civil service applicants, no inspectors to check the source of
foreign capital, no tax audits, no legal provisions against organized crime, and
no protection for government witnesses.""1  The absence of appropriate
legislation paralyzed the police to the point where some Russian citizens
concluded that.the police had stopped functioning. 52 These citizens lived in
fear while the absence of appropriate laws created a situation in which
gangsters did not need to fear prosecution.
Recently, the Russian government passed a new civil code,53 and it plans
to pass new tax and criminal codes in 19 9 7 .' While this new legislation may
help alleviate some problems, gaps still exist in the laws, and many believe the
new codes will not make a difference.55 The Russian judiciary is "plagued by
lack of funds and inefficiency and the memory, still fresh, of how Soviet laws
50. The State is Losing the Struggle Against Economic Crime: Russia is Being Destroyed Not by
Militants but by Financial Adventurers, NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, Sept. 10, 1994, at i, 3 (condensed text),
reprinted in CURRENT DIG. OF THE POST-SOVIET PRESS, Oct. 12, 1994, vol. XLVI, no. 37, at 3, available in
LEXIS, News Library, CDSP File.
51. CLAIRE STERLING, THIEVES' WORLD: THE THREAT OF THE NEW GLOBAL NETWORK OF
ORGANIZED CRIME 101 (1994).
52. Paul Klebnikov, Russia-on-the-Pacific, FORBES, Mar. 27, 1995, at 85, 86.
53. David Hoffman, Russia Gets New Laws for Free Market: Impact of Civil Code May Top
Constitution, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, WPOST File.
54. Aleksander Osokin & Natalia Khoroshavina, New Criminal Code Deals with Economic Crimes,
MoScow TIMES, Sept. 19, 1996, available in LEXIS, News File, MOSTMS File.
55. Hoffman, supra note 53; Osokin & Khoroshavina, supra note 54.
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became a tool of totalitarianism." 6  As a Moscow teacher stated, "[The
Russian people] know the courts don't work, and everyone will spit on [these]
new code[s]. No one believes in the law. We are living according to our own
laws."57 In short, even with the new laws, Russia's ineffective legal system
remains a fertile garden in which the mafiya can thrive.
C. Professionalization of the Mafiya
Another factor that helped empower the mafiya was the great number of
highly skilled individuals in its ranks. After the collapse of the Soviet Union,
thousands of former government workers and KGB agents lost their jobs.
Accustomed to the traditional perks of Party membership and faced with the
depressed wages of everyday life, many of these people joined the mafiya
According to Dr. Arnaud de Borchgrave from the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, "the KGB and organized crime are inextricably
intertwined." 9 As a result of its close affiliation with the KGB, "the maftya,
which a decade ago seemed to most observers underdeveloped and provincial,
was provided with institutional and organizational experience, professional
intelligence techniques and tradecraft."'  Further, these highly trained people
not only brought their expertise to the maflya, but they also brought with them
a vast system of government contacts and informants. With these skills and
contacts, organized crime took advantage of the new economic situation,
especially, in the area of banking where it is estimated that half of Russia's
commercial banks are under the mafiya's control.6
In addition to the KGB and the apparatchiks, many scientists also turned
to crime. Deprived of government sponsorship and possessing skills which
were in high demand, scientists found lucrative work with the mafiya.
Specifically, organized crime was interested in two groups of scientists, the
chemists and the nuclear physicists. With chemists in their employ, organized
crime groups could produce new synthetic drugs. For example, cooperation
between chemists and organized crime led to the creation and marketing of
56. Hoffman, supra note 53.
57. Id.
58. HANDELMAN, supra note 12, at 293-4.
59. Global Organized Crime Hearing, supra note 7, at 33 (statement of Arnaud de Borchgrave,
Senior Advisor, Center for Strategic and International Studies).
60. Id at 98 (statement of Representative Ed Royce).
61. Klebnikov, supra note 37, at 133.
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trimethyl phentanyl, or "3MF," a highly addictive synthetic drug. Developed
in 1993, this drug is currently in wide distribution, adding to the misery of the
average Russian and filling criminal coffers. 62 Like chemists, the addition of
nuclear scientists to the mafiya's rolls helped open new markets and generate
profits. Today, several nations are trying to acquire nuclear weapons by way
of Soviet technology.63 Consequently, by controlling nuclear materials and
information, organized crime groups are able to control the key to tremendous
riches.'
Based on the above facts, it is clear that one of the reasons the mafiya grew
so quickly after the collapse of the Soviet Union was that it inherited a great
deal of the former government's most skilled workers. The mafiya's sustained
growth suggests that it had not only gained the services of the present class of
professionals, but it had also captured the hearts and the minds of the future
professionals. The great Soviet heroes are no longer the role models for
Russian youth. Instead, the stock broker and the mafiya hitman have replaced
these icons.65 In greater and greater numbers, the best of the youth have
chosen the mafiya as a profession. Peter Derby, president of Dialog Bank, a
Russian-American joint venture, says "[the young are] joining up just as if they
were joining a corporation like Coke or Pepsi. It's a career choice that brings
rewards earlier rather than later."' Indeed, the rewards of working for the
mafiya are clear. A youth working as a hitman could earn $10,000 - $18,000
a killing,67 while the average Russian worker only makes about $150.6 This
disparity in wages coupled with difficult economic conditions make it
increasingly unrealistic to believe that an unemployed youth would resist the
siren song of organized crime. Alexander Lulikov, deputy-intemal affairs
minister, acknowledged this fact when he asserted that "unemployed young
62. HANDELMAN, supra note 12, at 202-4.
63. Global Organized Crime Hearing, supra note 7, at 76 (testimony of Ariel Cohen). The
governments of Algeria, North Korea, India, China, Iraq, Iran, and Libya are all using ex-Soviet nuclear
scientists to develop nuclear weapons. Id.
64. The fact that 7.8 kilos of weapons-grade plutonium has a street value of $13 million illustrates
the profits which can be generated through the sale of nuclear materials and information. Id. at 32 (statement
of Arnaud de Borchgrave).
65. HANDELMAN, supra note 12, at 345.
66. Klebnikov, supra note 37, at 128.
67. Igor Moiseyev, Mafia Clans Battle for Moscow, Moscow NEWS, July 5, 1996, available in
LEXIS, News Library, MOSNWS File.
68. Geoff Winestock, Tariffs Reflect a Stronger Ruble, Moscow TIMES, Mar. 5, 1996, available
in LEXIS, News Library, MOSTMS File.
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people are increasingly being recruited by crime syndicates."'69
The professionalization of organized crime in the former Soviet Union
made it possible for the mafiya to rise quickly to power. The combined
resources of both its young and old recruits made it more than a match for the
emasculated Russian government, and they have allowed organized crime to
take advantage of the legitimate order. Nevertheless, in spite of the
importance of the mafiya's past victories, the most demonstrative evidence
signifying the danger the new "professional" mafiya entails was the recent
statement of U.S. Representative Ed Royce, a member of the House
International Relations Committee on International Organized Crime. In
congressional hearings, Royce recognized that the "'professionalization' of the
Russian mafiya poses new threats not just in Russia but in the world financial
markets and the United States.
70
D. Absence of a Legal Culture
The final factor that allowed the rapid and sustained growth of the mafiya
in the former Soviet Union was the absence of a legal culture. A legal culture
has been defined in the following manner:
[It] is ... a [habit of mind] which infuses individuals and society at
large with a sense of legality and motivates citizens to prosecute their
legal rights and, even more importantly, to care about the legality of
public action. . . .This definition asserts that legality is a social
phenomenon, dependent on the beliefs of the population. Even stable,
consistent law enforcement is not an adequate measure of a society's
legality without citizens [believing] that such a legal climate exists
and will continue.7'
Based on this definition, there is no legal culture in the former Soviet Union
not only because stable law enforcement does not exist, but also because the
citizens do not believe a legal climate exists. As a result of the absence of this
legal culture, the mafiya has flourished in the post-Soviet states because what
69. HANDELMAN, supra note 12, at 27.
70. Global Organized Crime Hearing, supra note 7, at 98.
71. Daniel McGrory, Civilizing the Russian Underground Economy: Requirements and Prospects
for Establishing a Civil Economy in Russia, 5 TRANSNAT'L L. & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 65, 92-3 (1995).
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it was doing at first was not considered illegal. Organized crime was not the
only group that was stealing. Everyone was.
Under the Soviet regime, the Party elite, the members of the bureaucracy,
and average citizens all participated in illicit activity. Among the members of
the government, corruption was rampant. For example, "the mayor of Sochi
...was able to build a fantasy mansion with a singing fountain" using the
money he made from accepting bribes and kickbacks.72
Surprisingly, corruption was nearly as prevalent amongst the people. In
fact, longtime Russian expert Marshall I. Goldman asserted that "[b]ecause of
the pervasiveness of the state, both politically and economically, it became
socially and morally acceptable-politically correct if you will--to cheat the
state."73 Cheating the government became an accepted part of everyday life,
and the State would often turn a blind eye to this corruption. According to
seventy-year-old Valentina Bogdanova, "The Communists themselves used to
steal, and they let us steal."'74 Due to the government's lax law enforcement,
especially in the black market, the people did not develop "a sense of legality
[that] motivates citizens to prosecute their legal rights and, even more
importantly, to care about the legality of public action."7 Consequently, when
communism collapsed and the economic situation began to foster massive
mafiya expansion, no one even thought to sound the alarm because millions of
other ordinary citizens had already been stealing from the State.76
Under communism the legal culture was subject to relentless erosion; but
when the Soviet Union collapsed, it appeared that the people of the Newly
Independent States would have an opportunity to rejuvenate it. Unfortunately,
however, their attitudes and environment have not changed significantly. As
Russian journalist Yuri Shchekochikhin stated, "[c]orruption is like the air we
breathe.... It's not worse than it was before, but reforms have allowed more
people to take part."'  In short, after being submersed in corruption for so
many years, the people had learned to accept it, condone it, and participate in
it; as a result, the mafiya was able to quickly seize control of a large chunk of
72. HANDELMAN, supra note 12, at 94.
73. Marshall 1. Goldman, Why is the Mafia So Dominant in Russia? (Special International Report),
CHALLENGE, January 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, ASAPII File.
74. Marcia Kunstel & Joseph Albright, Communist Victory a Blow to Yeltsin; With a Presidential
Vote Looming, Parliamentary Election Gains Significance, AUsTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Dec. 19, 1995, at Al,
available in LEXIS, News Library, AUSTIN File.
75. McGrory, supra note 7 1, at 92.
76. Sterling, supra note 19, at 19.
77. Ulrich, supra note 6, at 13.
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the old Soviet empire.
III. CRIMINALS AND THE ECONOMY
Ineffective privatization, the lack of law enforcement, the
professionalization of organized crime, and the absence of a legal culture have
allowed the mafiya to become one of the premier actors in the former Soviet
Union. In addition to a lack of relevant criminal law, the Newly Independent
States also lacked relevant contract law. Without these laws, basic transactions
could not take place. The transition governments did not enact the necessary
legislation, and the mafiya stepped in and filled the gap in an effort to make
profits. Unfortunately for the people, the cost of this mafiya activity has been
great and threatens to have a more significant effect in the future. In this
section, I examine three issues. First, I explore why the mafiya's intervention
in the economy was inevitable. Second, I discuss the costs associated with the
mafiya's intervention. Finally, I demonstrate why organized crime has
undermined the future economic success of the former Soviet Union.
A. The Need for Protection
When Mikhail Gorbachev launched his perestroika campaign in 1986, the
Western world cheered because it appeared capitalism would eventually come
to the Soviet Union. Ten years later, capitalism has arrived; but surprisingly,
the Russian legal system is still woefully unprepared to deal with it.
According to Michael Mc Faul, "[tihe state... has not institutionalized a legal
system to protect [private] property rights, govern bankruptcy procedures,
enforce contracts, protect consumers, and ensure competition. Contracts must
be totally self-enforcing to work because the state cannot enforce them.""8
Without such regulation, many entrepreneurs find themselves in legal limbo
because it is impossible to enforce a contract. Moreover, according to
commentators in the Brookings Review, "failure to pay for goods or services
ordered and delivered exacts virtually no official penalty."' Since the spring
of 1995, "fully forty-five percent of the aggregate volume of accounts
78. McFaul, supra note 38, at 95-96.
79. Clifford Gaddy et al., Mafiosi and Matrioshki: Organized Crime and Russian Reform,
BROOKiNGS REv., Winter 1995, at 26, 28.
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receivable in all Russian industry were delinquent."8 This lack of enforcement
forced business owners to turn to organized crime for help.
By dealing with the mafiya, an individual can safely enter into contracts
because the mafiya will ensure enforcement. Furthermore, the mafiya protects
its clients from other criminal groups which may try to take advantage of the
business owner. In his book, The Sicilian Mafia (which also looks at
organized crime in Russia), Diego Gambetta attributes the rise in organized
protection rackets in Russia to fears of losing property and being cheated." As
a result of the growth of these two fears, individuals demanded trust, "trust in
other people and trust in whoever has the power to enforce property rights.""2
Unable to turn to the government, the people had to put their trust in the
mafiya to enforce contracts.
Currently in the former Soviet Union, individuals have to deal with
organized crime if they want to do business.83 In fact, the first thing an
entrepreneur must do, according to Canadian businessman Doug Steele, "is
find a roof.""M A roof, or krysha, is the colloquial term for mafiya protection.85
In Russia, between seventy percent and eighty percent of all privatized
enterprises and commercial banks pay for a krysha.86 If a business has not paid
tribute to the mafiya, then its owner will end up paying someone else. Steele
acknowledged that "you're going to have to pay somebody, and if it's not the
so-called mafia then it's going to be the police or OMON (elite interior
ministry troops) or some other official structure." '
The amount of a krysha ranges from ten percent to twenty percent of
turnover, which frequently comes to over half of an enterprise's gross profits.8
Further, "[if] a firm under the mafia's control fails to pay its tribute on time,
it falls into serious debtor dependence. A criminal gang will demand a twenty-
80. Id
81. Criminals as Insurance Agents, ECONOMIST, July 8, 1995, at 52 (discussing DIEGO GAMBETTA,
THE SICuIAN MAFIA: THE BUSINESS OF PRIVATE PROTECTION (1996)).
82. Id.
83. Mike Trickey, The Cost of Doing Business; As Russia Enters Capitalism, the Mafia Demands
a Cut-or Else, OTrAWA CITIZEN, Oct. 7, 1995, at El, available in WESTLAW, OTWCTZN File. In support
of this statement, Geoffrey Carr-Harris, a Georgian businessman, asserts, "You've got to make arrangements
with [the mafiya]. It's a part of doing business." Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. The Russian Mafia Assembles Dossiers on Important Officials and Politicians, IZVESTIA, Jan.
26, 1994, at 1, reprinted in CURRENT DIG. OF THE POST-SOVIET PRESS, Feb. 23, 1994, vol. XLVI, no. 4, at
14, available in LEXIS, News Library, CDSP File [hereinafter Mafia Assembles Dossiers].
87. Trickey, supra note 83.
88. Mafia Assembles Dossiers, supra note 86.
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five percent monthly surcharge, payable in foreign currency, for the past due
debt."8 9 Consequently, while mafiya protection has certain benefits, it is not
cheap; and its effect on the economy is not readily apparent.
B. The Cost of Protection
Paying for protection, whether it be to a criminal gang or to corrupt
members of the government, has several disadvantages to the economy as a
whole. First, it raises the cost of doing business. Consequently, it increases
the cost of consumer goods, making it very difficult for the average Russian
to purchase essential products. Second, it discourages would-be entrepreneurs
from starting legitimate businesses. The eruption in gang violence, the high
costs of doing business with organized crime, and the risk of future extortion
all act to prevent potential profitable businesses from forming.'
Third, because the mafiya takes a percentage of its clients' profits,
business owners often do not accurately report their earnings to the mafiya.
Similarly, business owners frequently fail to disclose their earnings to the
government for related reasons. 9' One reason is that the government is full of
mafiya informants.' If an entrepreneur told his krysha that he only earned
10,000 rubles, and his krysha found out through a government contact that the
individual had actually made 50,000 rubles, the business owner would suffer
serious reprisals.
Another reason business owners do not report earnings to the government
is to avoid taxation. In Russia, taxes can be crippling. Federal and local taxes
can consume as much as ninety percent of profits.93 This heavy taxation forces
individuals out of the normal economy and into the shadow economy. For
example, official statistics for 1994 show a thirty-eight percent drop in the
89. Kryshtanovskaya, supra note 39.
90. A potential criticism of this analysis is that relative to no protection at all, the maflya's services
could be viewed as lowering the cost of doing business. This argument assumes that no other viable contract
enforcement entity exists. Initially, after the collapse of communism, there may not have been a viable
alternative to the maflya, but in the long term, the Russian government is a more desirable choice. Mafya
involvement in contract enforcement deters, or even prevents, the establishment of legitimate government
regulation, particularly when the mafiya is deeply involved in the government and its influence is growing.
Therefore, mafiya enforcement cannot be viewed as being advantageous in the long term because it inhibits
the establishment of legitimate government regulation.
91. Russia's Statistics Fail to Add Up, FIN. TIMEs, Nov. 4, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library,
FINTME File.
92. Mafia Assembles Dossiers, supra note 86.
93. Klebnikov, supra note 52, at 86.
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volume of consumer services. Experts attribute this drop to people failing to
report in order to avoid taxation.' Ironically, by not reporting, whether to
avoid the mafiya or the government, the effect is the same. The decreased
revenue the government receives forces it to increase taxes in order to
compensate for its losses. Higher taxes then suppress economic activity and
force more people into the arms of organized crime.9"
Fourth, mafiya protection discourages foreign investment in the former
Soviet Union. To begin with, the increase in crime associated with the mafiya
deters foreign investment. In a recent article in the New York Times, Russia
was described as "one of the most dangerous places [in the world,] . . . [a
place] where a business traveler runs risks just getting from an airport into
town."'  Indeed, it is not uncommon for criminal gangs to kidnap foreign
businessmen and ransom or kill them.97 In order to deal with this threat,
foreign businesses must hire security guards for themselves, their families, and
their property. Unfortunately, adequate security is very expensive. Faced with
these costs, which can absorb as much as thirty percent of profits, many firms
refuse to invest in Russia and the Newly Independent States.9"
Foreign firms also dislike doing business in the former Soviet Union
because they are not immune from the need for a krysha. Although it is
possible to do business in the former Soviet Union without cooperating with
the mafiya,' many foreign investors, like Doug Steele, work through organized
crime and pay the fee in order to ensure their contracts are enforced. This
cooperation, however, increases the cost of doing business, decreases profits,
and, ultimately, discourages investment.
The maflya also discourages foreign investment because of the effect
organized crime has on the tax system. By forcing legitimate business
94. Tamara Smimova, The Economy: Flying from the Light into the Shadows, PRAVDA, Aug. 26,
1994, at I (condensed text), reprinted in CURRENT DIG. OF THE POST-SOVIET PRESS, Sept. 21, 1994, vol.
XLVI, no. 34, at 19, available in LEXIS, News Library, CDSP File.
95. Gaddy et al., supra note 79, at 28.
96. Paul Burnham Finney, Security Is a Growing Worry for Executives Working in Some
Increasingly Unsafe Overseas Areas, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 3, 1996, at D7.
97. Global Organized Crime Hearing, supra note 7, at 75 (testimony of Ariel Cohen). In fact, even
when the foreign businessmen are careful to avoid contact with organized crime, they are at risk. For
example, John Hyden, a British executive, was shot dead while enjoying a cup of coffee in a five-star hotel
in St. Petersburg. Ironically, he was an unintended victim of a mafiya hit aimed at a Russian executive in
the same room. Finney, supra note 96.
98. Global Organized Crime Hearing, supra note 7, at 75 (testimony of Ariel Cohen).
99. See Michael Lyster, International Trade: Overcoming Crime, Rubles, ORANGE COUNTY Bus.
J., Nov. 13, 1995, available in WESTLAW, ORGCTYBUSJ File.
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underground, organized crime requires the government to maintain high tax
rates in order to assure revenue. These high tax rates cut into foreign firms'
profit margins and discourage investment. "The whole system is ... anti-
business. The tax laws are asinine and guarantee that if you do everything..
• by the book, you won't make any money," declared Geoffrey Carr-Harris,
who presides over Phargo Group, a company whose outlets sell many different
products ranging from computer systems to lingerie.'" In concurrence with
Carr-Harris' statement, individuals in the oil industry computed that "if they
paid all the taxes that are on the books, their taxes would exceed 120 percent
of their profits."'' ° Ironically, companies that try to avoid paying taxes often
end up in a worse situation than those which do pay them, because the
companies which fail to pay make themselves vulnerable to mafiya
extortion.0 2 If an organized crime group discovers that a business is cheating
on its taxes, it presents the entrepreneurs with an undesirable choice: "Either
pay tribute or be 'turned in' to the tax police."'03  As a result, foreign
companies face a no-win situation. They can invest in Russia, pay taxes, and
lose money, or they can invest in Russia, evade taxes, and pay tribute to the
mafiya. Faced with such a choice, it is not surprising that many foreign firms
are reluctant to invest in the former Soviet Union."°
Finally, the mafiya discourages foreign investment by fostering general
corruption.' The United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977
(FCPA) °6 "criminalized the making of certain 'corrupt' payments to foreign
government and political officials and adopted rigorous record keeping
100. Trickey, supra note 83.
101. Goldman, supra note 73.
102. Id.
103. Mafia Assembles Dossiers, supra note 86.
104. Due in part to the prevalence of the mafiya, Russia's international investment rating places it
"among the bottom ten nations.., with the most off-putting investment climate." Valentin Sharov, Waiting
for a Dovnpour of Gold, TORGOVO-PROMYSHLENNYE VEDOMOSTI, at 3, reprinted in RUSSIAN Bus. & ECON.
NEWS, Oct. 2, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, SBE File.
105. According to the American Chamber of Commerce in Russia, "Corruption is growing into a
serious hurdle to investment [in that country]." Bribes Booming in Russia, U.S. Chamber Report Says,
WALL ST. J., June 27, 1995, at AI0 [hereinafter Chamber Report].
106. Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 & 78dd-2, as amended.
This act was amended as part of an omnibus trade bill passed in 1988.) See Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 100-418, tit. V, subtit. A, pt. 1, §§ 5001-5003, 102 Stat.
1107, 1415-25 (1988).
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requirements for public companies and their overseas subsidiaries.' ' 7
Consequently, U.S. firms are prohibited from engaging in conduct that would
violate the FCPA. In Russia, however, corruption is rampant in part because
of the influence of organized crime. As a result, the FCPA may make U.S.
businesses hesitant to invest in Russia because of "the very real prospect that
corrupt payments will be demanded ... ."" Another aspect of this problem
is that since 'no other nations have legislation like the FCPA, only U.S.
companies are limited in the actions they can take to obtain foreign business."
Therefore, U.S. firms may find themselves at a competitive disadvantage in the
former Soviet Union because they cannot take part in the primary means of
acquiring business--bribery. Despite the fact that other countries have not
passed laws regulating the conduct of their businesses abroad, the corruption
in Russia still serves as a serious disincentive to foreign investment because
of the escalating cost of bribery. According to a report by the American
Chamber of Commerce in Russia, "[w]hat used to be a reasonable and almost
codified system of payments has now lost all sense of reality and proportion.
Whereas before a bottle of vodka or small gift would have produced the
necessary signature [in Russia's bureaucratic maze], today it may require
significant payments or wire transfers to offshore bank accounts.""' In these
ways, the mafiya system discourages foreign companies from investing in the
former Soviet Union.
C. Undermining the Future
While the mafiya may serve as a surrogate for the government and enable
merchants and businessmen to enforce contracts, it does not provide this
service in order to better the average Russian citizen's standard of living. The
mafiya provides protection for its own prosperity; therefore this service comes
107. JEFFREY P. BALOS & GREGORY HUsIsAN, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: COPING
WITH CORRUPTION IN RUSSIA AND OTHER TRANSITIONAL ECONOMIES, PLI ORDER No. A4-4485, PRACTISING
LAW INSTITUTE COMMERCIAL LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 1 (1995).
108. Id. at 5.
109. Id. (citing International Procurement: Hearing Before the Legislation and National Security
Subcomm. of the House Government Operations Comm., 104th Cong., 1 st Sess. (1994) (statement of Mickey
Kantor, United States Trade Representative)).
110. Chamber Report, supra note 105, at AI0. Evidencing the increasing cost of corruption, the
World Bank recently reported that "the bribes are large by international standards, and in the Ukraine, for
example, can represent up to two months' gross sales per year." Kevin Done, High Levels of Bribes Harms
Pace of Growth, FIN..TIMES, June 28, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, FINTME File.
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at a cost. The previous section illustrates several of these costs, but there are
still others. The most problematic of these costs is the mafiya's lack of
accountability to the public. The mafiya is only concerned with maximizing
short term gains, and it does not reinvest its profits in the infrastructure of the
former Soviet Union. As Alexander Smirnov, a television producer, explains,
"[members of the mafiya] can steal, they can kill, but cannot do real business.
... They never develop something. They just take and sell or destroy."''
The problems of capital flight and the smuggling of natural resources
typify this dilemma. Capital flight occurs when crooked officials and
gangsters take profits stolen from the Russian people and send this money out
of the country. Since 1990, they have sent as much as $100 billion to their
foreign bank accounts, a sum which is greater than the total amount of post-
1990 Western aid."' The trend is similar with respect to the smuggling of
natural resources. Everything is leaving, and nothing is coming back in.
The Russian Interior Ministry estimates that smuggling of such natural
resources as oil grew by fifty percent from 1992 to 1993. The
Ministry believes that approximately 20,000 metric tons of metals,
over 100,000 metric tons of oil products, and more than 200,000 cubic
yards of timber were smuggled abroad from Russia in 1993, with up
to a trainload a day passing through Lithuania and into the port of
Kaliningrad alone." 3
The problem with this huge outflow is that it undermines the future
economic success of Russia and the other Newly Independent States of the
former Soviet Union. Their respective governments do not gain any income
from these transactions. Consequently, nothing is invested in the
infrastructure. Furthermore, because this outflow deprives the governments
of much needed tax income, they cannot provide services to the people, nor
can they fund their economic reform programs. Therefore, in the end, the
mafiya's interaction with the economy stifles economic reform and aggravates
public discontent. In short, the only people who benefit from this activity are
the criminals."4
111. Jonas Bernstein, Anti-Crime Plans Falter as the Russian Mob Reigns, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 27,
1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, WTIMES File.
112. Luttwak, supra note 11, at 48.
113. Global Organized Crime Hearing, supra note 7, at 71 (testimony of Ariel Cohen).
114. See THE ECONOMICS OF ORGANIZED CRIME (Gianluca Fiorentini & Sam Peltzman eds., 1995).
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IV. SEIZING THE REINS
By taking advantage of the privatization movement, protection rackets,
smuggling, and other illegal activities, the mafiya grew very rich and powerful.
However, in spite of its wealth, it was still vulnerable to government action
directed against it. Consequently, the mafiya began a campaign to influence
government decisionmaking and secure its new position in the social
hierarchy. "5 It attempted to accomplish this objective through a variety of
methods.
A. Money Talks
First, organized crime utilized its financial resources. According to the
Internal Affairs Ministry, organized crime uses almost fifty percent of its
capital to bribe representatives of State agencies and the judicial system."'
These bribes in turn comprise over half of a corrupt bureaucrat's income."'
In addition to outright bribery, criminals use lobbying to influence officials.
Over time, this lobbying evolves into a "special infrastructure of daily relations
between politicians and mafiosi"' '"8 in which the criminal and the politician
look after each other's interests. Another way the mafiya influences
government decisions is by supporting political parties. For example, "[i]t is
known that the Solntsevo gang, one of the most influential in the Moscow
region, has close contact with... [the] Russian National Unity people."'"9 In
This book "draws on evidence that shows that crime has serious consequences for legitimate economies
• . primarily because it concentrates on the appropriation of wealth and the distortion of markets rather than
on new production." The Story of the Underworld in 11 Essays, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1996, available in
LEXIS, News Library, FINTME File. One study "points out that in the 1970s and the early 1980s the area
of southern Italy with the highest growth rates were [sic] those with the lowest levels of both organised and
conventional crime, whereas those with the greatest mafia presence were the only economically stagnant
regions of Italy." THE ECONOMICS OF ORGANIZED CRIME 35 (Gianluca Fiorentini & Sam Peltzman eds.,
1995).
115. According to President Yeltsin, "organized crime is persistently trying to gain access to Big
Politics and the machinery of [the] state." Izvestia's Analytical Center, Whom Does Power Belong to in
Russia? Ministry of "Legit Thieves": Attempt at Political Burglary, IZVESTIA, at 1, reprinted in RUSSIAN
PRESS DIG., July 20, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, SPD File.
116. Kryshtanovskaya, supra note 39.
117. Sterling, supra note 19, at 19 (1991 estimate of the All-Union Research Institute of the Soviet
Interior Ministry).
118. Kryshtanovskaya, supra note 39.
119. Id.
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Russia, while the Duma has debated anti-lobbying legislation,' there are no
regulations concerning campaign or party funding,' and as a result, the mafiya
can "invest" in a politician's career with relative impunity.
B. Direct Participation
The second way the mafiya influences politics is through direct
participation in the political process. In fact, gangsters are so interested in
becoming a part of the government that by October 1995 over 100 suspected
criminals had already declared their candidacy for the Duma elections in
December of that year." Besides the power which accompanies the position,
one of the primary motivations for criminals joining the Duma is immunity.
According to current Russian law, "Russian legislators cannot be searched,
detained, questioned, charged, arrested, tried or convicted, even for crimes
they have committed before taking office, without the consent of a
parliamentary majority."'" This immunity even covers murder. For example,
"Sergei Skorochkin, a liquor manufacturer, claimed parliamentary immunity
in 1994 after he killed two people in a shootout he said was initiated by the
mafia."'2 4 In the recent Duma elections, the problem of criminals running for
office reached such massive proportions that Russia's acting prosecutor-
general, Oleg Gaidanov, warned "[m]afiosi of all ages and all types are trying
to get into power." ' 5 Further, the Itar-Tass news agency reported that even
Russian President Boris Yeltsin expressed alarm "at the marked intensification
of criminal elements trying to get into the State Duma."'' 6 Nevertheless,
despite the public outcry against organized crime, Russians still elect criminals
to public positions.'27
C. Flexing Its Muscle
120. See Lobbying Law Targets the Mafia, E. EUROPEAN MARKETs, Nov. 24, 1995, available in
LEXIS, News Library, EEM File.
121. Shelley, supra note 26, at 836.
122. Inga Saffron, Russian Crooks Stay Out of Jail by Seeking Office in Parliament, HOUS. CHRON.,





127. For example, Sergei Mavrodi, head of the MMM financial empire and pyramid investment
scheme, was elected to office despite the public notoriety of his misdoing. Id.
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The third way the mafiya interferes with politics is through violence. By
utilizing the threat or the use of force, organized crime groups can influence
the decisions of politicians or remove the politicians who oppose them. Since
the collapse of communism, the mafiya has murdered members of the
parliament12 and intimidated others. 129In addition to using violence to
influence the decisions of current government officials, the leaders of
organized crime groups also used force to get into office. Itar-Tass reported
that President Yeltsin was concerned that "honest candidates are being
pressured to drop out of races for the Duma by criminals who were hoping to
boost their chances."' 3° Also, many people suspect the mafiya of using force
to create vacancies in government positions. For example, when the police
began to pressure Sergei Mavrodi for his involvement in the MMM pyramid
investment scheme, the local Duma seat became vacant when its prior
occupant was murdered, and Mavrodi was conveniently elected to fill the
vacancy."
D. Controlling the Press
The fourth way the mafiya seeks to gain political advantage is through
control of the press. By controlling the press, organized crime influences the
opinions of both the legislators and the masses. Further, it allows criminals to
keep the public from discovering the mafiya's most egregious offenses, which
shields certain mafiya activity from public scrutiny. The crime gangs seek to
control the press in many ways. Some gangs purchased entire media
enterprises when the government privatized them,"' while others subsidized
128. Shelley, supra note 26, at 835. Two members of parliament who were killed by organized
crime are Andrei Aizderdzis and Valentin Martemyanov. Id. See also Charles Heckler & Pyotr Yudin,
Deputies Murder Shocks Duma, Moscow TIMES, Apr. 28, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library,
MOSTMS File; Pyotr Yudin, Motive for Murder is Unknown, Moscow TIMES, Apr. 28, 1994, available in
LEXIS, News Library, MOSTMS File.
129. Dmitry Pavlov et al., Explosion in the State Duna: Deputy Nikolia Lysenko Is Left Without
an Office, KOMMERSANT-DAILY, Dec. 6, 1995, at 14 (condensed text), reprinted in CURRENT DIG. OF THE
POST-SOVIET PRESS, Jan. 3, 1996, vol. XLVII, no. 49, at 16, available in LEXIS, News Library, CDSP File.
The office of Nikolai Lysenko, a member of the State Duma, was destroyed by an explosive device. While
the police have not proven mafiya involvement, his supporters believe organized crime groups are
responsible for the attack. Id.
130. Saffron, supra note 122.
131. Id. Mavrodi was the first to exercise the parliamentary immunity defense.
132. HANDELMAN, supra note 12, at 23-4.
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struggling newspapers and television networks133 or resorted to bribery.134 By
buying into or exerting financial pressure on the media, organized crime can
dictate what the public sees and hears, a power that is especially important
before elections. For example, Yuri Goryachev, the governor of Ulyanovsk,'35
has an arrangement with a local editor in which the editor is allowed relative
autonomy, but when Goryachev needs it, the editor must "do as [Goryachev]
say[s] and pour dirt on who [he] say[s] ....
Another way the mafiya can assert its influence over even the Western
media is through the use of lawsuits. Due to its wealth, the mafiya is able to
use the threat of a lawsuit to intimidate the press. Faced with expensive
litigation, the media will often alter what it intended to publish. In fact,
Professor Louise Shelley reported that "[s]everal western newspapers have
failed to publish articles that disclose the activities of Russian organized crime
groups because they fear the costly suits that will follow.""
As opposed to direct financial intervention and lawsuits, the cheaper and
more common methods of controlling the press are intimidation and murder.
Indeed, "[for the Russian mafia, the journalist has become enemy number one.
If this enemy cannot be bought, he is destroyed."'' In 1994, eleven journalists
died violently and countless others were beaten or intimidated.'39 The
criminals are fearless and often attack in broad daylight. "Who would give
evidence?" asked Tamara Lomakina, a journal editor who was beaten badly by
criminals who did not like the content of her articles.140 Also, no amount of
public notoriety insures a journalist's safety. This fact was demonstrated by
133. See Elizabeth Tucker, The Russian Media's Time of Troubles, 4 DEMOKRATIZATSIYA 429
(1996).
134. In a 1995 article, Jean Chichizola reported that "[b]ribery is a key to controlling the media and
its output, particularly where employees are underpaid." Jean Chichizola, The Untouchables; Russia's
Media Comes to Grips with the Strong Men of the Moscow Mafia, I INDEX ON CENSORSHIP 185, 186 (Tom
Nicholls trans. 1995).
135. Tucker, supra note 133, at 434. According to Gennady Antontsev, a journalist in Ulyanovsk,
"Goryachev and his deputies are mafiosi bought and paid for ..... Id. at 433.
136. Id. at 434 (statement of Nikolai Poftarev, a businessman in Ulyanovsk).
137. Threat from Russian Organized Crime: Before the House Comm. on International Relations,
CONG. TESTIMONY (FDCH), Apr. 30, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, CNGTST File (statement
of Louise I. Shelley, Professor, American University, Department of Justice, Law and Society, and School
of International Service).
138. Valery Vyzhutovich, The Murder of Journalist Dmitry Kholodov Was A Terrorist Act Against
Freedom of Speech, IzvESTLA, Oct. 19, 1994, at 1 (condensed text), reprinted in CURRENT DIG. OF THE POST-
SOvIET PRESS, Nov. 16, 1994, vol. XLVI, no. 42, at 4, available in LEXIS, News Library, CDSP File.
139. Id.
140. HANDELMAN, supra note 12, at 85.
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the violent deaths of Vladislav Listyev, a popular television newsman,"4' and
Dmitry Kholodov, an investigative reporter who was exposing military
corruption. 42
The perpetrators of crimes against the press are rarely caught or
punished,"3 so there is little to deter organized crime from attempting to
control the press.. Over time, many journalists simply stop writing stories
condemning the mafiya. For example, in Vladivostok, "[a]fter a few
imprudent journalists were beaten up, the local press ceased to speak out...
Freedom of expression is relatively new to the former Soviet Union.
Unfortunately, the previous State control of the media is slowly being replaced
by mafiya control,'45 enabling organized crime to exert intense pressure on the
political process.
E. Economic Dependence
The final way organized crime influences politics is through the economy.
Even though the economic endeavors of the mafiya are often illegal, they do
generate a great deal of capital. Consequently, local governments are loath to
pass legislation attacking organized crime for fear they will lose the economic
benefits associated with the mafiya. An example of this type of influence is
the relationship between the government of Estonia and the metal trader Tiu
Silvas. Silvas is Estonia's richest businesswoman, and she has suspicious ties
to old Party hierarchy. Nevertheless, the Estonian government dares not cross
her.
Every time the government suggests that it wants to investigate her
company, she gets mad and threatens to move out of Estonia and take
all her wealth with her. It always works. The government does not
want to kill a goose that lays such golden eggs. Metal trading has
141. Boris Yeltsin: Fearing to Turn Russia into a Police State, We Are Afraid to Tighten the
Struggle Against Gangsterism, ROSSIISKAYA GAZETA, Mar. 3, 1995, at 2, reprinted in CURRENT DIG. OF THE
POST-SOVIET PRESS, Mar. 29, 1995, vol. XLVII, no. 9, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, CDSP File
[hereinafter Fearing a Police State].
142. Vyzhutovich, supra note 138.
143. Id.
144. Klebnikov, supra note 52, at 86.
145. losif Dzialoshinsky, a Russian media expert and head of the Independent Newspaper
Association, predicts, "There will be no independent newspapers in Russia. All the papers will be closely
associated with various financial and political groups. All of them." Tucker, supra note 133, at 429.
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made this country rich, so it's in no one's interest to probe too
deeply.14
6
Estonia is not the only place in the former Soviet Union where this type
of relationship between mafiya figures and the government exists. As time
passes and organized crime's grip on the economy grows stronger,
governments will become subordinate to mafiya power. When this day arrives,
the newly formed democracies will cease to govern for the people. Instead,
these governments will govern for the criminals.
F. The Cost of "Mafiya " Participation
In April 1994, the Chairman of the Russian Duma Committee on Security,
Victor Ilyukhin, reportedly stated that "the current Yeltsin government stands
a good chance of becoming a 'criminal state' in relation to the close ties
between organized crime and institutionalized corruption.' 1 47  Further, some
experts maintain that over thirty percent of the Duma "is directly linked to
organized crime."' 4 Indeed, the relationship between the mafiya and members
of the government is often so close that "today it is truly impossible in many
cases to differentiate between Russian organized crime and the Russian
state."'49 The costs of this mafiya participation in the government are great.
First, corrupt politicians seek committee positions so they can influence the
issues that concern them. For example, in 1994, "Vladimir Podatev, a thrice-
convicted 'crime kingpin'(theft, armed robbery, rape), nicknamed 'The
Poodle,' became a member of the Human Rights Commission under the
President of Russia's Public Chamber."' 150
146. HANDELMAN, supra note 12, at 245. A Tallinn journalist conveyed this story.
147. ULRICH, supra note 6, at 13.
148. Global Organized Crime Hearing, supra note 7, at 33 (statement of Amaud de Borchgrave).
149. Threat from Russian Organized Crime: Before the House Comm. on International Relations,
CONG. TESTIMONY (FDCH), Apr. 30, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, CNGTST File (statement
of U.S. Representative Benjamin A. Gilman, Chairman). A good example of the identity between many
members of the government and organized crime is the 1994 debate in the upper chamber of the Russian
parliament, the "Senate," over whether to pass a proposed crime bill. During this debate, many senators
asked, "Why should we adopt a resolution which actually okays a decree spearheaded against ourselves?"
In fact, one senator, Sergei Levitan, even went so far as to refuse to pass the bill because it would "cut off
money laundering channels for the [Russian] Mafia." Elena Tregubova, Federation Council Is Against Anti-
Banditry Decree, SEGODNYA, at 2, reprinted in RUSSIAN PRESS DIG., June 25, 1994, available in LEXIS,
News Library, SPD File.
150. Kryshtanovskaya, supra note 39.
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Second, once these corrupt politicians maneuver themselves into positions
of power, they use their influence to impede and weaken proposed legislation
that runs counter to the mafiya's interests. For example, "in hearings before
the Federation Council, legislators with questionable financial holdings used
highly suspect arguments to prevent consideration of the corruption law."''
Third, the damage done by corrupt legislators is especially harmful to the
future of the Newly Independent States because these governments are in their
formative stages. The legislation passed today will govern these countries in
the future; and, according to Professor Louise Shelley, "once the basic
framework is enacted, vested bureaucratic and financial interests combined
with inertia will make it difficult to implement fundamental change."'52 The
longer a government waits to take action against organized crime the harder
the mafiya will be to dislodge.
V. ONE STEP FORWARD, TWO STEPS BACK
A. Public Discontent
The mafiya 's presence in the former Soviet Union has created a great deal
of public discontent because of the increase in crime, the corruption in
government, and the collapse of the economy. Many Russians, like Nair
Aleyev, twenty-three and unemployed, complain they are "sick and tired of life
like this. Banditry, prices, and inflation." '
In the first year after the fall of communism, the Russian public
prosecutor reported 2.7 million crimes, an increase of thirty-three
percent over 1991. The rates for murder, rape, and aggravated assault
continued to climb during the first six months of 1993, along with
categories of crime that had been negligible during the Soviet era,
such as drug trafficking, embezzlement and theft of government
property."
151. Shelley, supra note 26, at 835 (citing Aleksander Danilkin, Mafia - nash rulevoi, TRUD, Dec.
10, 1994, at 6).
152. Id.
153. Kunstel & Albright, supra note 74.
154. Handelman, supra note 15, at 92 n.3. When considering these figures, it is important to note
that a statistical comparison of crime rates between Russia and the Soviet Union is likely to be skewed by
the Soviet practice of underreporting crime. More recent figures, however, confirm that crime is on the rise.
In a February 1996 report, the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs disclosed that "crime was up significantly
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As a result of this increase in crime, in 1992 "three out of four Muscovites
admitted they were afraid to walk the streets alone at night." '155 One year later,
"forty-nine percent of Russians rated crime higher on their list of concerns
than unemployment."'5 6 The people have lost their sense of personal security,
and the government appears powerless to do anything. Consequently, the
populous is extremely dissatisfied with the current state of affairs, and many
are calling for government action.
Adding to the Russian people's feelings of dissatisfaction is the bleak state
of the economy. Growing inflation has decreased the already meager buying
power of the ruble, and many are unemployed. Further:
Russia has become more economically stratified than even the United
States. Thirty-five percent of all Russians now live below the poverty
line. Fifty percent are barely hanging on. Fourteen percent, mostly
the young and the adaptable, have plunged headlong into
"Newbiznessky." And less than one percent have become fabulously
wealthy through semi-legitimate businesses or organised crime." 7
Due to this intense stratification, the "sight of the country's newly rich
emerging from luxury restaurants and gambling casinos, of Western cars
jamming the roadways, [and] of gunmen strutting down the street" brings an
intense feeling of betrayal and anger to the average Russian.'58 When this
anger is coupled with the general feeling of dissatisfaction, it produces a
restless electorate. Consequently, many experts, like Steven Handelman, fear
the mafiya presence in the former Soviet Union will lead to a movement
towards authoritarianism or an eventual return to communism.
in sixty-three regions [of Russia]. [In fact, tihe number of reported crimes increased by 4.7 percent over
1994 and stood at 2,755,700 .... " Aleksandr Anuchkin, Internal Affairs Minister Kulikov Reports to
Public, SEVODNYA, Feb. 20, 1996, at 6 (condensed text), reprinted in CURRENT DIG. OF THE POST-SOVIET
PRESS, Mar. 13, 1996, vol. XLVIII, no. 7, at 14, available in LEXIS, News Library, CDSP File.
Furthermore, the number of murders committed in Russia is striking. In 1995, "[allmost twenty-one out of
every 100,000 Russians were murdered, compared with ten out of 100,000 people in the United States and
six in Germany." Of Commerce and Criminality, Moscow TIMES, July 2, 1996, available in LEXIS, News
Library, MOSTMS File.
155. Handelman, supra note 15, at 91.
156. Id. at 91-92.
157. Fashion: The Likely Vlads, OBSERVER, Sept. 10, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library,
OBSRVR File.
158. Handelman, supra note 15, at 91.
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B. Authoritarianism
The Russian people are unhappy with the current state of the nation.
According to Ariel Cohen, "nostalgia in Russia for the 'good old days' of the
Brezhnev era is growing. . . . [T]he post-communist societies long for a
'strong hand.""59  Unfortunately, this "strong hand" would entail an
infringement on individual civil liberties. Nevertheless, the Russian people
want strong action. In one survey of public opinion, "more than half the
Russians sampled deemed Yeltsin's [1993] crackdown acceptable, even if his
decree violated the Constitution."' 60
In response to the people's demands and under intense political pressure,
Russian President Boris Yeltsin has scaled back reforms and has become
increasingly authoritarian. 61 In a speech made after the murder of popular
television reporter Vladislav Listyev, President Yeltsin's comments seemed to
foreshadow escalating government authoritarianism. In the beginning of this
speech,.Yeltsin claimed that in the battle against organized crime he feared
turning Russia into a police state. However, he later stated, "There are
approaches harsh enough to make mafia groups tremble. They will be given
no quarter, and only in that way can we halt the wave of crime that has swept
over us."'
162
Since the first day of his regime, President Yeltsin's most egregious
violations of the principles of democratic government and human rights have
come in an effort to fight crime. These actions include the presidential edict
"On Urgent Measures to Protect the Population from Banditry and Other
Manifestations of Organized Crime;' 63 Operation Signal; " the evening assault
159. Global Organized Crime Hearing, supra note 7, at 74 (testimony of Ariel Cohen).
160. Jeff Trimble, Enemies of the People Once Again?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 18, 1994,
at 39.
161. Peter Reddaway, a professor of political science at George Washington University, states that
"[iln the past two years, [Yeltsin] has been behaving increasingly like a czar. He pardons cronies, ignores
the law, issues a torrent of decrees and hands out economic favors by the ton." Peter Reddaway, Russia
Heads for Trouble, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1996, at AI5.
162. Fearing a Police State, supra note 141.
163. Under this June 1994 edict, an individual suspected of mafiya involvement "may be held for
thirty days without the right to post bail. Yeltsin suspended such suspects' right to post bond, be released
on their own recognizance, or released under the care of a public organization or private individual." Yeltsin
Gives Prosecutors, Police Stronger Tools for Fighting Crime, RUSSIA & COMMONWEALTH BUS. L. REP.,
June 27, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, RCBLR File.
164. See HANDELMAN, supra note 12, at 289-90. Operation Signal was a massive military and
police action which took place after the October 1993 crisis. Its purpose was to reduce the level of
organized crime in Moscow by forcibly deporting all "unregistered aliens." This action had racial and ethnic
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on the MOST bank;16 and the bloody war in Chechnya.'" Unfortunately, what
both the Russian people and President Yeltsin fail to realize is that these
authoritarian actions do not affect the principal mafiya interests. Stephen
Handelman points out that Operation Signal "had almost no impact on
Russia's organized-crime syndicates. The most powerful Caucasian gangs,
including the Chechens, suffered at best only a temporary [setback].' 67
Further, the bloody war in Chechnya has failed to produce any great measure
of success against the Chechen gangs despite the amount of devastation it has
caused.
Another foreboding event which may lead to a more authoritarian
government is the appointment of Aleksandr Lebed as Yeltsin's new national
security council secretary.6 s  Lebed, a retired general, has sworn to fight
organized crime and return order to Russia.'69 However, he has made several
authoritarian statements, 70 and some commentators fear that "Lebed's [crime]
program is based on Vladimir Lenin's dictum 'terror is the quickest justice[]'
.... ,,3i In particular, Sergei Kovalev, a member of the Duma and a highly
respected human rights activist, predicted that under the Yeltsin-Lebed
alliance, "Russia will be governed in a draconian manner and will quickly
distance itself from a state of law."' 72  The extent to which Lebed will
undertones, and it basically targeted individuals from the Caucasus. Id
165. See Shelley, supra note 26, at 832. President Yeltsin's elite presidential guard carried out this
assault in December 1994. The government justified the attack as an effort to curtail organized crime, but
the newspaper Izvestia labeled it an abuse of presidential power which "could bring on a police state." Id.
166. See Andrew Meier, The Chechen Mafia: The Real Reason Yeltsin Invaded, NEW REPUBLIC,
Apr. 24, 1995, at 16. One of the reasons President Yeltsin ordered troops into Chechnya was to combat the
organized crime groups stationed there. Nevertheless, the war has resulted in numerous human rights abuses
and thousands of Chechen and Russian casualties. For more information on the casualties and human rights
abuses in Chechnya, see Crisis in Chechnya: Hearings Before the Comm. on Security and Cooperation in
Europe, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
167. HANDELMAN, supra note 12, at 290.
168. Michael R. Gordon, Yeltsin Chooses a Rival for Security Post, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1996, at
Al. On October 17, 1996, President Boris Yeltsin dismissed Aleksander Lebed from the position of national
security chief. Despite his ouster, Lebed may still influence the nature of the Russian government because
of his prominent position in the Russian political arena. Michael Specter, Shake-Up in Russia: The
Overview; Yeltsin Angrily Announces Dismissal of Aide He Hailed as a Likely Political Heir, N.Y. TIMES,
October 18, 1996, at AI.
169. Jonas Bernstein, Lebed Plan Attacks Crime, Corruption, Moscow TIMES, May 30, 1996,
available in LEXIS, News Library, MOSTMS File.
170. Lebed has said that "shooting 3,000 people would not be too high a cost to pay for cleaning
up society." Tough Fight Ahead in Crime War, Moscow TIMES, June 20, 1996, available in LEXIS, News
Library, MOSTMS File [hereinafter Crime War].
171. Igor Pankov, Lebed: He Laughs Best Who Shoots First, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, at 2,
reprinted in RusstAN PRESS DIG., July 6, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, SPD File.
172. Rights Activist Kovalev Warns Against Yeltsin-Lebed Alliance, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, June
19961
GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES JOURNAL
undermine Russian democracy is unclear, but most commentators agree that
in his fight against organized crime, Lebed is likely to lead the Russian
government to the right.'73
Ironically, in the long run the government's movement towards
authoritarianism actually benefits the mafiya. It has this effect because a non-
progressive, authoritarian government slows reform and cements organized
crime's hold on the economy.74 Ignorant of this fact, the Russian public
continues to cry out for strong government action, and President Yeltsin's
response is predictable. He continues to slow reform and move towards an
"old-style" government. Consequently, if President Yeltsin does not change
his course, he will almost guarantee the mafiya's triumph over law and order.
C. Communism and Ultranationalism
Even if President Yeltsin turns away from a return to authoritarianism,
there is a strong possibility that Russia will continue down that path without
him. Despite Yeltsin's victory in the Russian 1996 presidential election,'75 the
electorate remains deeply divided.7 6  In the December 1995 State Duma
elections, the Communists won in almost every region of Russia.'77 While
some political scientists maintain the strong showing by the Communists in
December's election was not indicative of the power they wield, 7 ' it does
demonstrate that a large portion of the population desires a more conservative
form of government. Consequently, as pointed out by a 1994 study, "failure
to take resolute measures to remove the economic roots of crime and to
provide the legal guarantees for the struggle against organised crime, as well
as a lack of political will in combating organized crime, could bring the
19, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, AFP File [hereinafter Kovalev's Warning]. Another fear is
that Lebed will become a Russian Pinochet. See Anatoly Sosnovsky, From "Collective Rasputin" to
"Collective Pinochet," ITOGI, at 19, reprinted in RUSSIAN PRESS DIG., June 30, 1994, available in LEXIS,
News Library, SPD File.
173. See Crime War, supra note 170; Kovalev's Warning, supra note 172; Pankov, supra note 171;
Reddaway, supra note 161, at A15.
174. Reddaway concurs with this assertion. He states, "Most clan leaders of industry, agriculture
and banking, with their corrupt allies in government, do not want democracy or serious economic reform.
... [Tihey want security for their assets ... [which] requires an end to anything but a facade of democracy."
Reddaway, supra note 161, at Al 5.
175. Russia's Daunting Future, ECONOMIST, July 6, 1996, at 43.
176. Forty percent of the electorate voted for the Communist Party in the 1996 presidential election.
Id.
177. Michael Specter, Anger Got the Votes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1995, at A8.
178. See Michael McFaul, A Communist Rout?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1995, at A2 1.
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national-socialists [or the Communists]179 to power .... 9)"o If either the
Communists or the ultranationalists come to power, it will certainly sound the
death knell for many newfound civil liberties and a large number of the
progressive reforms which Yeltsin's government has implemented. I", The
effect of this action, like the effect of President Yeltsin's move towards
authoritarianism, will only strengthen the mafiya's grip on Russia. However,
it is not necessary for the Communists or the ultranationalists to come to power
to spell the demise of reform. The mere fact that they hold a large share of the
seats in the Duma is enough to assure the pace of reform will be slowed.
VI. THE CRIMINAL TIME BOMB
When the Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union reach the
point where public dissatisfaction causes a reversion towards authoritarianism
or communism, these States will begin to lose the ability to fight organized
crime effectively. From that time forward, the mafiya will become more
firmly entrenched in the structure of society until no government action can
remove it. In order to understand why this result might occur, one must
understand the interrelationship of the trends and processes described in this
Note.
Despite the strict law and order image the Soviet Union displayed, highly
organized criminal groups were functioning behind the curtain of State
authority. When communism collapsed, these groups no longer had to hide in
the shadows. They came forward and discovered an environment in which
they could flourish. By taking advantage of (1) the massive privatization, (2)
the ineffective legal system, (3) the wide availability of professional talent, and
(4) the absence of a legal culture, the mafiya flourished in the Newly
Independent States.
179. This addition is my assertion based on the large share of the votes the Communist candidate
received in the 1996 presidential election. See Russia's Daunting Future, supra note 175.
180. ULRICH, supra note 6, at 15. This study specifically referred to the 1996 presidential election.
However, based on the strong public sentiment regarding crime in Russia, 1 believe it remains a valid
statement.
181. This result seems clear based on prior conservative statements of these two groups. For
example, in 1994, Zhirinovsky pledged that "[the Liberal Democratic Party would] set up courts on the spot
to shoot the leaders of criminal bands." Jayson Carcione, Russia a Dangerous Place to Do Business,
REUTER Bus. REP., Feb. 2, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, REUBUS File. And recently,
Zyuganov promised that if elected he would "restore public control over manufacturing industry .
Russia's Communists, A Dreadful Prospect, ECONOMIST, Mar. 16, 1996, at 54.
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Soon, organized crime began to interact with the economy. It found the
State had failed to provide for basic contract enforcement, so the mafiya began
to provide protection. Unfortunately, while providing this service increased
the mafiya's wealth, its overall effect on the economy was negative.'82 The
mafiya decreased the effectiveness of the government's reform policies and
increased social stratification. As a result, public dissatisfaction grew, and
many people began to express feelings of anger and betrayal.
Organized crime amassed formidable financial and physical resources
through its interaction with the economy, and it used these resources to
influence government decisionmaking.8 3 Often, the mafiya's influence
inhibited economic progress because the mafiya would oppose reform intended
to improve the economy. As time passed, an increasingly dissatisfied
electorate pressured Yeltsin to adopt a hard-line, authoritarian approach, and
voted numerous ultranationalists and Communists into the parliament. In
response to public sentiment, both Yeltsin and the new conservatives slowed
reform. This action played right into the mafiya's hands because, by putting
the brakes on reform, the government solidified the mafiya's position in
Russian society.
The slowing of reform is beneficial to organized crime for the following
reasons. First, if the Duma does not pursue reform, then Russian legislators
will not pass new criminal and commercial legislation. The police will remain
powerless to deal with organized crime, and business owners will continue to
depend on the mafiya for contract enforcement. Second, the current inefficient
political structure will stay the same. The corrupt government officials already
in office will remain, and organized crime will still be able to influence
legislation. Third, absent reform and new laws, the government will be forced
to curtail civil liberties in a desperate attempt to confront organized crime.
When this happens, freedom of the press will diminish even further, which
means the mafiya's corrupt dealings with the State will be safe from exposure.
Also, since a free press is essential to the development of a legal culture,"' the
legal culture in the former Soviet Union will remain stagnant. Fourth, a lack
of reform means effective privatization of the remaining State property will not
occur, an eventuality that will suppress grass-roots economic activity and rid
organized crime of any future competition.
182. See supra notes 78-114 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 115-152 and accompanying text.
184. McGrory, supra note 71, at 92-93.
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In summary, the slowing of reform maintains or enhances all the factors
which allowed the mafiya to flourish in the first place. Thus, in the absence
of reform, the mafiya becomes stronger, and a snowball effect occurs: As its
wealth and power grow, the effect of organized crime on the economy
expands. The mafiya becomes richer, while the rest of the population suffers.
Moreover, because of these impressive financial resources, the mafiya will
continue to attract current and future professionals, and it will be able to exert
greater influence on the government, slowing reform even further. Meanwhile,
public discontent will grow; the parliament will enact increasingly
authoritarian and anti-reformist legislation; and then, the entire process will
begin again. Over time, the mafiya will grow even stronger and become so
intertwined in the economies and governments of the former Soviet Union that
the governments will not be able to remove it. Therefore, it is time for a
clarion call: If the governments of the former Soviet Union continue to scale
back reform, they are doomed because they will gradually lose their ability to
deal effectively with the mafiya.
VII. THE INTERNATIONAL THREAT
If the mafiya does become so entrenched in the former Soviet Union that
the local governments cannot remove it, then it poses not only a domestic
threat but also an international threat. After the collapse of communism, it was
not long until the entire world began to feel the impact of the mafiya's rise to
power.
One-third of all the serious crimes in Poland were attributed to the
"Russian mafiya."... In Sofia, Bulgarian police reported that it was
virtually impossible to open a business without paying protection
money to Russian gangsters. Over an eighteen-month period between
1991 and 1993, Russian gangs were responsible for at least a dozen
murders in Berlin.185
In addition to those crimes, Russian mobsters committed murders in New York
City '6 and Los Angeles,' and they are quickly becoming preeminent players
185. HANDELMAN, supra note 12, at 256.
186. Id.
187. See Russian Organized Crime: Hearing Before the Senate Government Affairs Permanent
Subcomm. on Investigations, CONG. TESTIMONY (FDCH), May 15, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library,
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in global money laundering,' 8 drug distribution,8 9 and prostitution."9
Nevertheless, despite growing mafiya involvement in those areas, it was the
risk of Russian gangsters smuggling nuclear weapons out of the country that
led U.S. Senator Sam Nunn to state, "organized crime in the former Soviet
Union is fast becoming not only a law enforcement nightmare, but a potential
national security nightmare."'' Indeed, according to a group of Russian
generals and admirals, it is not a question of whether nuclear weapons will be
smuggled out of Russia. Rather, it is a question of when."9
As a result of the threat the mafiya poses, governments around the world
are justifiably concerned with its development. If the mafiya does become
entrenched in the former Soviet Union, the world will have to fear both the
mafiya and a more militaristic Russia. This result will occur because all States
have a basic need for security.'93 As the mafiya's power in Russia grows, the
amount of transnational crimes it commits will increase because of domestic
market saturation. In response to this increase, the other nations of the world
will begin to pressure Russia to control its crime problem. However, because
of the presence of criminals and corrupt officials in the Russian legislature, the
government will not take effective action against the mafiya. As a result,
foreign nations will increase the pressure on the Russian government and may
even refuse to invest in or trade with Russia. If this happens, Russia's
economic plight will worsen, public discontent will increase, and the Russian
people will elect a more conservative and nationalist government. This
government will feel increasingly threatened and isolated by the actions of the
other world nations. It may attempt to remedy its security dilemma by
increasing its military preparedness and armaments, a course of action which
could increase international tensions and threaten a return of the Cold War.
CONCLUSION
CNGTST File (statement of Detective Bill Pollard).
188. See Shelley, supra note 26, at 831.
189. See HANDELMAN, supra note 12, at 195-206.
190. See Sterling, supra note 19, at 19. In Germany, "[o]ut of some 200,000 licensed prostitutes,
more than a quarter come, courtesy of the various syndicates, from eastern Europe." Imre Karacas, Trial
Spotlights Vice Gang Wars; Frankfurt Massacre: Defence Blames Russian Mafia Hitmen for Killings at
Brothelfor the Rich, INDEPENDENT, Jan. 27, 1996, available in LEXIS, News File, INDPNT File.
191. HANDELMAN, supra note 12, at 263.
192. Global Organized Crime Hearing, supra note 7, at 32-33 (statement of Arnaud de Borchgrave).
193. KENNETH N. WALTZ, THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 126 (1979) (asserting that the
interaction between States in an anarchical international system is governed by a quest for security).
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The criminal time bomb is ticking, and the nations of the world cannot
afford to waste a second because the longer they wait, the worse the situation
will become. Russia and the other Newly Independent States of the former
Soviet Union cannot be allowed to coexist with the mafiya. Instead, these
governments must take immediate action to stop the mafiya's rise to power.
Hopefully, with the assistance of the other nations of the world, the Newly
Independent States of the former Soviet Union will be able to maintain steady
economic and political reform and defuse the criminal time bomb before it
explodes.

